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NOTE
Labor Law: Tate v. Browning-FerrisIndustries:
Oklahoma Creates a Common Law Action for
Employment Discrimination
Terminable at-will employment is one of the most entrenched of common law
maxims. In its traditional formulation, the terminable at-will rule holds that an

employer may discharge a worker for "good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of a legal wrong."' The wide discretion

granted to employers in the hiring and firing process was deemed justified in the
interests of economic efficiency and preserved by judicial reluctance to inquire into

the employment contract.
Since World War II, however, the clarity of many venerable common law doctrines
has been muddied by courts increasingly inclined to enforce equitable considerations.2
Gradually, as courts inevitably tamed their attention to the employer-employee

relationship, limited exceptions were created to the general rule of at-will employment
as well? Prominent among these modifications is the "public policy exception,"
prohibiting employers from terminating an employee where such a discharge would

violate a recognized state interest.4

In 1989, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the public policy exception to atwill employment in Burk v. K-Mart.5 The Burk decision culminated a stammering
effort by the court to mitigate the harshness of pure at-will employment in Oklahoma.

I. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton
v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
2. Cf Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988) (tracing
the decline of laissez-faire ideas in property law).
3. For a summary of each state's wrongful discharge law, see HENRY H. PERRIr, JR., EMPLOYEE
DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRACtCE §§ 112-116 (4th ed. 1992).
4. The public policy exception to the at-will rule has generated a significant amount of academic
literature. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., The
Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights, 10 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1 (1981); Mary A.
Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the
New Property,20 B.C. L. REV. 457 (1979); Gary E. Murg & Clifford Scharrnan, Employment at Will:
Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 329 (1982); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust
Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Clyde W.
Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481
(1976); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied ContractRights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 335 (1974); Peter S. Partee, Note, Rebutting the Presumptionof Employment at Will, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 689 (1991); Note, ProtectingEmployees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter Note, The Public Policy Exception]; Note,
Protectingat Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith,
93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Duty to Terminate].
5. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
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However, Burk was not intended to be a wholesale vitiation of the at-will rule. The
language of Burk indicated that the exception was tightly circumscribed; it seemed to
be limited to cases in which an employee was terminated for acting in compliance
with a well-recognized public policy of the state.'
Oklahoma's acceptance of the public policy exception was a belated recognition that
a common law remedy should be afforded in certain circumstances to employees who
are unjustly dismissed. Indeed, where an employee has no statutory recourse, the
exception serves both to redress the aggrieved employee and deter employers from
actions detrimental to the public interest.7 In the recent decision of Tate v. BrowningFerris Industries,8 however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, greatly expanding the
scope of the public policy exception, held that the exception applies to dismissals
based on status characteristics such as race or sex as well as to discharges predicated
on an employee's -.ctivities. Significantly, Tate allows an employee now to seek relief
under both the common law and federal and state anti-discrimination statutes. This
seemingly innocuous change, announced in Tate, alters the potential liability of
employers and challenges the historical role of the public policy exception as an
interstitial remedy, available only to preserve rights that would otherwise go
unprotected.
This note analyzes the impact of Tate on the employment relationship in Oklahoma.
In part I of this note; the historical development and gradual erosion of the terminable
at-will rule are traced. Part II discusses -theinroads into the employment contract that
have been made by Oklahoma courts. The facts and holding of Tate are outlined in
part III. Part IV develops an analytical framework within which to evaluate the Tate
decision. This framework is based on an examination of similar cases from other
jurisdictions and an evaluation of the policies justifying recognition of a common law
action for employment discrimination. Finally, part V critiques the holding in Tate and
argues that, although the holding in Tate is correct, there are alternative grounds that
provide more persuasive justifications for the decision.
L The HistoricalDevelopment of Employment-at-Will
A. The Genesis of the At-Will Rule

The at-will rule of employment, although enshrined in the law, is, in fact, of recent
origin9 and is a uniquely American phenomenon."0 In early English law, for example,
6. Id. at 27.
7. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959); Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
8. 833 P.2d 12118 (Okla. 1992).
9. For a discussion of the origins of the employment-at-will doctrine, see Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Emiployment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-29 (1976); Daniel A.
Mathews, Note, 26 HSTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-46 (1975); Marsha WVeisburst, Note, Guidelinesfor a
PublicPolicy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule: The Wrongful DischargeTort, 13 CONN. L.
REv. 617, 617-21 (1981); Shapiro & Tune, supra note 4, at 34-47.
10. The United States is the only industrialized nation lacking statutory protection of workers that
limits the rights of an employer to arbitrarily terminate the employment relationship. Mathews, supra
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employment contracts were presumed to be for one year in duration, unless specified

otherwise." Moreover, English law required employers to provide reasonable notice
to employees before termination. 2 Until the middle of the nineteenth century, these

English precedents formed the basis of American law on employment relations as
well.3
In the United States, the durability of employment contracts became increasingly
questioned as industrialization progressed. 4 However, it was not until 1877 that the
at-will rule of employment was given precise formulation. In that year, Horace Gray
Wood, a New York lawyer, published a treatise on master-servant relationst 5 that was
to have tremendous impact on the development of American labor jurisprudence.
Wood argued that the English approach to employment contracts was inappropriate
for an industrialized economy. 6 In place of this perceived anachronism, Wood
declared that employers could fire workers at their discretion. Indeed, he set forth
a rule that still today is the law in most jurisdictions: "[A] general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."' 8
Wood's thesis was really a masterpiece in scholarly sleight-of-hand. There was
neither case law 9 nor compelling public policy interests justifying the dogmatic

note 9, at 1447 n.54.
II. See, e.g., Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026 (1834); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *425.
12. Feinman, supra note 9, at 121-22.
13. Id. at 122.
14. Id. at 124-25; Note, Duty to Terminate, supra note 4, at 1824.
15. HORACE GRAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).
16. Id. § 134, at 202.
17. Id. Prior to Wood's formulation, treatises usually stated that a hiring was presumed to be for one
year in duration. See, e.g., CHARLES MANLEY SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT 53-57 (8th ed. 1931).
18. WOOD, supra note 15, § 134, at 202.
19. Wood cited four cases in support of the at-will rule: Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462
(1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); De Briar v. Mintuin, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson
v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); and Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
WOOD, supra note 15, at 272 n.4. In fact, none of these cases supports Wood's arguments for
employment-at-will. These cases are discussed and criticized in Shapiro & Tune, supra note 4, at 343-46.
First,
Wilder dealt with a business contract between the Army and private entrepreneurs. The case had
nothing to do with general hirings. Second, in DeBriar, the controversy concerned the right of a
discharged bartender to occupy a room in the tavern after he had been asked to leave. Essentially a case
about unlawful eviction, the court held that an innkeeper had the right to eject a person living in his
house after providing proper notice to the tenant. Third, Tattersonactually contradicts Wood's argument
for the at-will rule. In Tatterson, the court found that there was no error in allowing the jury to determine
the nature of the employment contract from all circumstances surrounding its execution. There was no
presumption of at-will employment. Finally, in Franklin,the jury found that hiring for a year could be
inferred from the facts of the case. As a result, the jury held that a mining captain who had been assured
employment would be stable could not be terminated before one year.
20. Scholars have offered several explanations for the development of the at-will rule, including the
dominance of laissez-faire economics in the late nineteenth century, the importance that courts in this
era gave to freedom of contract, and class struggle between middle managers and business owners. For
an overview of the historical conditions in which at-will employment took root, see ANITA HiLL,
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assertion that American employment relations were on an at-will basis. Nevertheless,
despite the doctrine's dubious intellectual origins and debatable economic merits,2 the

at-will rule spread rapidly across the United States. By the early twentieth century,
nearly all states had adopted the at-will employment rule." The at-will rule was even
temporarily provided with constitutional clothing; in Adair v. United States," the
United States Sup;:eme Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting an employer

from firing workers who were union members.' Relying on the now-discredited
economic due process analysis made famous in the Lochner" case, the Court in
Adairheld that laws restricting the right of employers to terminate employees violated

the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6
B. The Erosion of the At-Will Employment Rule

While most jurisdictions still adhere to the at-will doctrine, the vitality of the rule

has been increasingly sapped by the combination of two forces. First, numerous
statutes have been passed that limit the employer's right to arbitrarily dismiss

employees.

For example, there are now federal laws prohibiting dismissal for

"WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT WILL EMPLOYMENT DoCTRINE 2-5 (Labor
Relations and Public Folicy Series No. 31, 1987).
21. Most academic commentators have criticized the economic bases of at-will employment, See,
e.g., Blades, supra note 4, at 1410-13 (arguing that the at-will rule creates economic inefficiencies by
granting employers monopoly bargaining power); Partee, supranole 4, at 708-09 (stating that the at-will
rule gives employers too much power in the labor market); Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra
note 4, at 1937-42 (stating that the at-will rule contributes to labor market stratification); Note, Duty to
Terminate, supra note 4, at 1828-36 (deciding that high information costs due to at-will rule create labor
market inefficiencies). But see Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 973-77 (1984) (asserting that the at-will rule is efficient and cannot be explained in terms of
putative market failures); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Causefor Termination Rules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1127-30 (1989) (replacing the at-will rule is costly).
22. 1 CHARLEs LABATr, MASTER AND SERVANT, § 159 (2d ed. 1913); Henry P. Farnham,
Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 469, 470-71 (1921).
23. 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a statute
prohibiting employers from forcing employees to agree not to join a labor union).
24. Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75.
25. Lochner v. Nc.w York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26. Adair, 208 U.S. at 176. The language of the Court's decision in Adair emphasizes the laissezfaire tenor of the time,:
It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations
with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon any reason, or is the result
of whim, caprie, prejudice or malice. With his reasons, neither the public nor third
persons have any legal concern. It is also his right to have business relations with any one
with whom he can make contacts, and if he is wrongfully deprived of this right by others,
he is entitled to redress.
Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
27. See, e.g., Con3umer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1988) (prohibiting dismissal of
employee because of wage garnishment); Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009
(1988) (prohibiting dismissal of an employee for refusal to take polygraph test); National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988) (prohibiting discharge for engaging in union activities); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988) (prohibiting discharge for reporting violation of Act); Age
Discrimination- in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (prohibiting age
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age, sex,29 race," and union activity." Moreover, many federal regulatory
statutes protect employees from dismissal because they reported violations of the
statutes?2 Most states also have laws providing various protections to employees.33
Since the New Deal, the United States Supreme Court has been willing to uphold
these types of legislative protection of workers.'
Second, and perhaps most fundamentally, unionization - although now a weakened
force - has provided protection for employees, obviating the application of the at-will
rule. Collective bargaining agreements today cover approximately 15% of the
nonagricultural workforce?' These agreements usually prohibit dismissal of an
employee without "good cause."36 In addition, over eighteen million American
workers - about 17% of the total workforce - are employees of federal, state, or
local governments and are usually not employed on an at-will basis? Consequently,

discrimination in employment); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §
660(c)(1) (1988) (protecting employees who report violations of Act); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1988) (prohibiting handicap discrimination by recipients of federal monies); Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (prohibiting discharge for asserting
right under Act and discharges due to employers' attempt to prevent benefit payments under pension
plans); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) (requiring
employers to give notice of plant closings or layoffs); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988)
(protecting employees who report false claims for government payment); Veterans Reemployment Act,
38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)(1), 2024 (1988) (protecting veterans and draftees from discharge); Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) (1988) (prohibiting race discrimination in employment);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2003-17 (Supp. III 1991) (prohibiting
discrimination on basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. III 1991) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability).
28. Age Discrimrination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. III 1991).
30. Id.; see also Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) (1988).
31. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(a)(9), 2302(b), 7102,7116(a)(4)
(1988); Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1988); Toxic Substance Control Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1988); Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980,20 U.S.C. § 3608
(1988); Jury System Improvement Act of 1978,28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988); Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1988); Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1988); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855 (1988); Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1988); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 58,551 (1988); Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1980, 45 U.S.C. § 441 (1988); Surface
Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (1988).
33. Oklahoma, for example, has passed several laws limiting the right of employers to arbitrarily
dismiss employees. See 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1302 (1991) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of age, handicap, or race); 40 OKLA. STAT. § 412 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (prohibiting dismissal for
reporting violation of state workplace safety statute); 38 OKLA. STAT. § 34 (1991) (prohibiting dismissal
for jury duty); 85 OKLA. STAT. § 5 (1991) (prohibiting discharge of employee for filing workmen's
compensation claim).
34. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1937).
35. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr

1992, at 422, tbl. 672 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
36. Peck, supra note 4, at 8.
37. STATIS'nCAL ABSTRACT, supra note 35, at 422, tbl. 672.
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the at-will rule today applies at most only to about 60% of the-workforce.
While at-will employment has become less prevalent in the labor market, judicial
willingness to create exceptions to at-will employment has further taken much of the

bite out of the terminable at-will doctrine. One method of attack, used by courts in
many states, has been to find an implied contract of job tenure in employment
handbooks and personnel manuals.38 Where an employer communicates a promise

through an employment handbook that employment will be terminated only for cause
or only after the edaustion of certain procedures, failure to abide by these promises

can support a wrongful dismissal claim based on breach of contract.39 A few courts
have used similar analysis in holding that oral promises of job security can create a

binding employment contract. 4'

38. One commentator has called the implied contract not so much an exception to the at-will rule
as an "alternative doctrinal means for rebutting the at-will presumption." Partee, supra note 4, at 697.
Over forty states accept this modification to at-will employment, although jurisdictions differ significantly
on the evidentiary reqtirements for such actions. See, e.g., Aiello v. United Air Lines, 818 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1987); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985); Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group,
Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz.
1984); Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 804 S.W.2d 683 (Ark. 1991); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981); Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987); Finley
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 724 P.2d
110 (Haw. 1986); Harkness v. City of Burley, 715 P.2d 1283 (Idaho 1986); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of
Nazareth Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 775 (IIl. 1987); Cannon v. National By-Products, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 638
(Iowa 1988); Morriss v. Coleman, 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987); Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp.,
655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Brannan v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 516 So. 2d 157 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Larrabee
v. Penobscott Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Staggs v. Blue Cross, 486 A.2d 798 (Md.
1985); Garrity v. Valley View Nursing Home, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 423 (Mass. 1980); Touissant v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn. 1983); Robinson v. Board of Trustees, 477 So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1985); Johnston v. Panhandle
Coop. Ass'n, 408 N.W.2d 261 (Neb. 1987); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983);
Panto v. Moore Businers Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260 (N.H. 1988); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,
491 A.2d 1257 (NJ. 1935); Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 (NM. 1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
44 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982); Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.
1984); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d
524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Yartzoff v. Democratic-Herald Pub. Co., 576 P.2d 356 (Or. 1978);
DiBonaventura v. Cons lidated Rail Corp., 539 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1988); Small v. Spring Indus., 357 S.E.2d
452 (S.C. 1987); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627
S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981);
Sherman v. Rutland Hcsp., 500 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081
(Wash. 1984); Cook v. Hecek's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1988); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666
(Wis. 1985); Mobil Coal Producing Inc., v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
39. See, e.g., Wagcnsellerv. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985) (holding
that employment manul's guarantees gave rise to implied-in-fact contract action); Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille, 333 N.W.'d 622, 631 (Minn. 1983) (holding that disciplinary procedures in employee
handbook were a legally enforceable promise not to dismiss employees without following the
procedures).
40. Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 779 F.2d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff had
an oral lifetime employment contract); Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135, 138 (Me.
1977) (holding that an oral promise that employee would be secure "for the rest of her life" provided
basis in contract for wrongful dismissal suit); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 442-43
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A second judicially crafted exception to at-will employment exists in the few
jurisdictions holding that employers have an implied duty of good faith and fair

dealing in employment contracts.4' Some courts have used this exception to imply
a promise of job security as a matter of law.4 In theory, the implied covenant is

broad enough to require employers to have good cause for termination.43 In no state,
however, have the courts read the exception in this way; instead, the courts accepting
the implied covenant have restricted their holding to requiring that employers not have

a bad faith motive in discharging an employee." So, despite the potential use of the
implied covenant, its limited acceptance and theoretical uncertainties hamstring its use
in wrongful dismissal cases.
The most common caveat to at-will employment, however, is the so-called "public
policy" exception, in which a private right of action is allowed where the dismissal
violated a recognized public policy of the state. This exception has now been adopted
by over forty states. Its pervasiveness notwithstanding, there is no uniformity of
(N.Y. 1982) (stating that employeres assurance in initial employment interview that discharge would only
be for just cause rebutted presumption of at-will employment).
41. Nine states appear to accept in one form or another the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in employment contracts. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala.
1987); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d
1063 (Mont. 1982); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
42. E.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
43. See generally PERRrrr, supranote 3, § 411 (discussing various jurisdictional approaches to the
implied covenant of good faith).
44. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that
covenant does not require good cause for dismissal); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 782
(Conn. 1984) (stating there is no action for breach of implied covenant for discharge without just cause);
see also PERRrrT, supra note 3, § 411.
45. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Knight v. American
Guard & Alert, 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986); Cross v. Coffrnan, 805 S.W.2d 44 (Ark. 1991); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, opinion on demand of reh'g, 747 S.W.2d 579 (Ark. 1988);
Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 610 P.2d
1330 (Cal. 1980); Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Assn, 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Sheets
v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional
Admin., 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Pamar v. American Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982); Ray
v. Namea Sch. Dist. No. 131, 814 P.2d 17 (Idaho 1985); Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978);
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Abrisa v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270
N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1986); Anco Constr. Co. v.
Freeman, 693 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1985); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983);
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981); DeRose v. Putnam Management Co., 496
N.E.2d 428 (Mass. 1986); Mello v. Stop & Shop Co., 524 N.E.2d 105 (Mass. 1988); Suchodolski v.
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408
N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Nye v.
Department of Livestock, 639 P.2d 498 (Mont. 1982); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980);
Ambroz v. Comhusker Square Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1987); Hanson v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394
(Nev. 1984); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical,
417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980); Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Boudar v. EG & G, Inc.,
730 P.2d 454 (N.M. 1986); Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. App. 1985); Krein v. Marian
Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors,
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approach to the public policy exception; jurisdictions differ on the subtle points of the

exception's application. For example, courts are far from monolithic in viewing the
appropriate sources for determining "public policies" of the state. Courts also differ
on the available damages for a successful claim under the public policy exception.4
There is also controversy over whether the public policy exception is preempted by
the availability of statutory relief for the wrongful dismissal."
H. The Employment Relationship in Oklahoma

Terminable at-will employment has been the law in Oklahoma at least since
1932.!' In the past fifteen years, however, the at-will employment rule in Oklahoma
has evolved in a way parallel to that of other jurisdictions; courts in this state flirted
with several modifications to the at-will doctrine before fully embracing the public

policy exception. For example, in Langdon v. Saga Corp.," the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals held that an employment manual's guarantees were enforceable contractual

provisions.52 The statements in the manual, the court reasoned, were a unilateral

Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 25 (Okla. 1989); Nees v. Hocks, 536
P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Ceary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); Ludwick v. This
Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D.
1988); Clanton v. Cain Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Payne v. Rozendaal,
520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986); Bowman v. State Bank, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985), Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Harless v. First Natfl Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978);
Brockneyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983); Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699
P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985).
Although the state ccurts in Mississippi and Rhode Island have not ruled authoritatively on this issue,
federal courts have concluded that these states would probably recognize the public policy exception to
at-will employment. Set? Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Cummins v. EG
& G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1988).
Only in Alabama, Georgia, Maine, and New York have courts explicitly rejected the public policy
exception. See William3 v. Killough, 474 So. 2d 680 (Ala. 1985); Evans v. Bibb Co., 342 S.E.2d 484
(Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152 (Me. 1991); Murphy v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
46. Compare Palmateer v. International Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (stating that
"public policy concerns what is right and just") with Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,
840 (Wis. 1983) (holding that public policy flows from statutes and state constitution) and Thompson
v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (deciding proper sources of public policy are
limited to statutes, state constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions).
47. Most courts allow for compensatory and punitive damages in cases under the public policy
exception. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Ill.
1978) (same); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. 1980) (stating that a full range of damages are allowed
in a public policy tort case). But see Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 703 (W.Va. 1982)
(striking down award of punitive damages in public policy tort case).
48. See infra parts IV-V.
49. See Singh v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 554 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1976); Sooner Broadcasting Co. v.
Grotkop, 280 P.2d 457 (Okla. 1955); Foster v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 6 P.2d 805 (Okla. 1932).
50. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
51. 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App, 1976).
52. Id. at 527.
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contract that had been accepted by the employee's continued service to the compa-

ny.s Although the holding in Langdon was subsequently limited by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court,' the decision marked the first time in Oklahoma that at-will

employment had been lirrited in any real manner and was a harbinger of further
judicial inquiry into the employment relationship. This part of the note analyzes the
efforts of the Oklahoma Supreme Court to circumscribe employment-at-will.
A. The FirstSteps to Limiting the At-Will Rule: Hall v. FarmersInsurance
Exchange and Hinson v. Cameron

In its initial foray into restricting at-will employment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
issued a confusing opinion that seemed to imply that at-will employment had been
eliminated in one fell swoop. In Hall v. FarmersInsurance Exchange,55 the court

acknowledged that at-will employment had long been the law in Oklahoma," but
nevertheless held that employment contracts had an implicit covenant requiring the
parties to act in good faith.' This covenant, the court stated, prohibited employers
from wrongfully resorting to the terminable at-will rule.58 As the court felicitously

phrased its justification: "[The interests of the people of Oklahoma are not best
served by a marketplace of cut-throat business dealings where the law of the jungle

is thinly clad in contractual lace."5 9

Hall could be read as adopting the most significant modification to at-will
employment, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.m Indeed, the Tenth
Circuit, asked to apply Oklahoma law shortly after Hall, did just that.6 In one
53. Id.
54. Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 554-57 (Okla. 1987). In Hinson, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court emphasized that not all statements in personnel manuals rebut the presumption of at-will
employment. For example, where personnel manuals or employment handbooks provide a noninclusive
list of grounds for termination, a discharge for a reason unenumerated in the manual will not necessarily
give rise to a breach of contract action. Id. at 557.
Other Oklahoma cases dealing with implied-in-fact contracts arising from provisions in an
employment manual have carefully examined the record for evidence of the parties' intent to create a
binding contract. See, e.g., Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 431-32 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Oklahoma
law, the court found that an employment manual's provisions created a property interest in the
employment that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution);
Williams v. Maremont Corp., 875 F.2d 1476, 1481-88 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Oklahoma law, court
held that express language in employee handbook was not sufficient to create a binding unilateral
contract absent a showing of communication, inducement, and reliance); LeMieux v. Kerby, 931 F.2d
1391 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Oklahoma law, court declined to imply a for-cause requirement for
discharge from a nonexclusive list of grounds for termination contained in employment manual);
Breshears v. Moore, 792 P.2d 91, 92 (Okla. Ct App. 1990) (holding that the employment manual's
description of termination procedures created a legal duty for employer to follow those procedures).
55. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
56. Id. at 1029.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1030.
59. Id at 1029.
60. See generally Michelle B. Johnson, Comment, Burk v. K-mart Corporation: The Oklahoma
Supreme CourtAdopts a Narrow Exception to the Employment at Will Rule?, 14 OKLA. Crr U. L. REv.
645, 665 (1989).
61. Grayson v. American Airlines, 803 F.2d 1097, 1099 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that Oklahoma
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decision, it appeared that Oklahoma had jumped from the back of the pack into the
vanguard of labor 'aw. Yet, Hall dealt with an agency relationship in which the
employee was wrongfully denied earned commissions and, thus, was not a typical
employment contrac t Although the court seemed to place no significance upon this
point," the unique facts in Hall left an opening through which the court could later
retreat from its audacious finding of an implied covenant of good faith. This retreat
m
came two years later in Hinson v. Cameron.
"

In Hinson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected a tort claim for wrongful
discharge.' The court held that an at-will employee could not sue her employer for
damages in excess of earned income.' Recognizing the ambiguity of the holding in
Hall, the court statel that relief was granted in that earlier case only because of the
unique agency relationship and the plain injustice of depriving an employee of income
already earned.f As the plaintiff in Hinson was a traditional at-will employee and
was not seeking the payment of previously earned income, the court refused to allow
a cause of action.' Employers, the court indicated, were under no duty to discharge
employees only for good cause."
B. Burk v. K-Mart: Oklahoma Adopts the Public Policy Exception to At-Will
Employment

Whatever confusion still existed about the viability of the at-will employment
doctrine was resolved by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Burk v. K-Mart,0 in which
the court recognized the public policy exception to terminable at-will employment."
The plaintiff in Burk, an at-will employee, brought an action in contract and tort
against her employer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in her employment contract. The plaintiff claimed that her employer's agents had
sexually harassed her, prevented her from performing her job responsibilities, and by
so doing, constructively discharged her from her job.

"recognizes a covenant of good faith [that] is implicit in every contract, even in at will employment
contracts").
62. In Hall,the plaintiff was an insurance agent who led a group of other agents in a protest against
the dismissal of a fellow agent by the defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange. Consequently, the
insurance company terminated Hall's agency and refused to pay him the value of future commissions that
had already been earned.
63. In reviewing cases from otherjurisdictions invoking the implied covenant of good faith, the Hall
court noted that these cases dealt with a contract between an employer and an employee, not between
an agent and principal. Id.at 1030. But the court found "nothing in the distinction which makes the
application of the [impliel covenant] any less desirable." Id.
64. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
65. Id.at 552.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id.; see also Blanton v. Housing Auth. of Norman, 794 P.2d 412, 417 (Okla. 1990) (refusing
to extend Hall to cases where a plaintiff seeks to recover future unearned income).
69. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 552.
70. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
71. Id.at 28.
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The court in Burk initially settled the controversy arising from Hall v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange regarding the scope of the implied covenant of good faith.n
While the court in Hinson v. Cameron had declined to impose a duty of good faith
on employees, it had left unresolved the question of whether bad faith discharges were
allowable.' In Burk, however, the court explicitly repudiated any notion of a
covenant of good faith in the employment-at-will context.74 Such a rigorous standard,
the court reasoned, "would subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the
amorphous concept of bad faith."'75 Motivated by the practical concerns of enforcement and the fear that the good faith standard was overly broad, the court rejected the
application of Hall to at-will employment.76
The Burk court was not willing to acquiesce to every termination of an at-will
employee, however. Recognizing the trend in other jurisdictions' the court chose
instead to fashion a new remedy in tort, available in an ostensibly narrow class of
cases in which the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. 8 This
modification of at-will employment, the court reasoned, is an equitable accommodation
of the competing interests of both employers and employees, as well as society3
Thus, the court fashioned a common law action for wrongful termination in violation
of a public policy of the state.'
The court in Burk was aware of the dangers of vexatious litigation under the newly
created exception and mindful of the protean nature of the term "public policy." 8' As
a result, the court attempted to clearly demarcate the borders of the public policy
exception. The court concluded that prior judicial decisions, as well as constitutional,
statutory, and regulatory provisions, were the appropriate expressions of Oklahoma's
public policies.' However, while the sources of public policy were broad, the
exception was to be quite limited. As the court stated: "[The circumstances which
present an actionable tort claim under Oklahoma law is [sic] where an employee is
discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established and well-defined public

72. See Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Oklahoma'sAt-Will Rule: Heeding the Warningsof America's Evolving
Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 374 (1987) (arguing "bad faith" discharges were actionable
in Oklahoma and expressing need for further judicial clarification of the at-will rule). See supra text
accompanying notes 55-63.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.

74. Burk, 770 P.2d at 27.
75. ld.
(quoting Hinson, 742 P.2d at 554).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
Burk, 770 P.2d at 28.
Id.
Id. at 27.

81. Id. at 28-29.
82. Id. at 29. The court stated:
In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is violated, courts should inquire
whether the employer's conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional,
statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme. Prior judicial decisions may also establish
the relevant public policy. However, courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to
declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject.

Id. (citation omitted).
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policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and compelling policy."" In
this language, the court indicated that the public policy exception was applicable only
to those cases in which an employee was discharged for volitional activity, i.e. acting
or refusing to act. Thus, a whistleblower who reported illegal activity or an employee
who refused to participate in illegal activity had a cause of action under Burk.
However, discharges due to status characteristics such as race or sex did not seem to
fall under the rubric of the Burk public policy exception.'M
The recognition of the public policy exception led immediately to considerable
litigation, giving courts the early opportunity to clarify the holding in Burk.s In these

cases, ranging from dismissals for whisleblowingM to dismissals for giving testimony
to Congress" or refusing to take a polygraph test,s the volitional standard was
consistently applied, although never explicitly stated as the rule. It was clearly implied

in these cases that a termination was not actionable unless the employee was dismissed
for acting in a way required by the public policy of the state. Employment
discrimination, it seemed, could not be the basis for a claim under Oklahoma's public
policy exception. 9
In Rosenfeld v. 7hirteenth Street Corp.,9' the Oklahoma Supreme Court had the

83. Id
84. This interpretat on of Burk is consonant with the general parameters of the public policy
exception set by other jurisdictions. For example, in Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 681 P.2d 114, 117 (Or.
1984), the Oregon Supre-ne Court divided public policy tort cases into three categories: (1) cases where
a plaintiff was discharge.] for fulfilling a societal obligation, such as serving on a jury; (2) cases where
a plaintiff was fired for the pursuing private statutory rights, such as the filing of a workmen's
compensation claim; and (3) cases where no other remedy exists to vindicate the public policy of the
state. Another instructive classification of public policy exception cases was provided by the Missouri
Court of Appeals in Boyle v. Vista Eyewear Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Boyle, the
court held that the public policy exception covers: (1) terminations for refusal to perform criminal acts
or acts contrary to public policy; (2) terminations for reporting employer violations of the law or public
policy; (3) terminations for acts that public policy encourages, such as jury duty; and (4) terminations
for seeking government benefits, such as workmen's compensation. Id at 874-75; see also Note, The
Public Policy Exception, supra note 4, at 1936-37 (outlining three classifications of public policy
exception cases).
85. In McGehee v. Florafax Int'l, 776 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1989), the Oklahoma Supreme Court gave
retroactive effect to its holding in Burk.
86. Vannerson v. Board of Regents, 784 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1989); Smith v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n,
825 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1992); Rosenfeld v. Thirteenth St. Corp., 117 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,446 (Okla.
1989).
87. Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 908 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1990).
88. Pearson v. Hope Lumber& Supply, 820 P.2d 443 (Okla. 1991). In Pearson,the court articulated
a prudential limitation on the public policy exception. The plaintiff in the case was discharged for
refusing to submit to a pilygraph examination. The plaintiff claimed that his termination violated the
Oklahoma Polygraph Examiners Act, 59 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1451-1476 (1981), which provides that the state
Polygraph Examiners Boasrd can revoke the license of any polygraph operator who does not inform a
subject that participation in the test is voluntary. The Oklahoma court found that the statute was not
designed to regulate conditions of employment. Pearson, 820 P.2d at 445. As a result, the statute could
not serve as the source fcr a claim under Oklahoma public policy exception. Id.
89. See Johnson, supra note 60, at 657 (concluding that an employee who was discharged due to
race or sex discrimination would not have claim under Burk).
90. 117 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 156,446 (Okla. 1989).
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opportunity to address the application of the public policy exception to employment
discrimination. In Rosenfeld, an employee-at-will claimed that he was terminated
because of his religious affiliation and his decision to report the illegal acts of his
fellow employees. In finding that the plaintiff had stated a claim under Burk, the court
identified the grounds for an actionable public policy claim.9' Such grounds included
discharges for:
(a) refusing to participate in illegal activity;
(b) performing an important public obligation;
(c) exercising a legal right or interest;
(d) exposing some wrongdoing by the employer; and
(e) performing an act that public policy would encourage or refusing to do
something that public policy would condemn, when the discharge is coupled with a
showing of bad faith, malice, or retaliation.'
It is difficult to see how a claim for religious discrimination fits into any of these
categories. Indeed, the court in Rosenfeld seemed to recognize this, focusing its
attentions on the plaintiffs claim that he had been discharged for whistleblowing, a
termination clearly falling within the criteria contemplated in the above list.'
Rosenfeld, then, appeared to tacitly reaffirm the volitional test, i.e., the public policy
exception does not embrace situations in which an employee is discharged for a trait
such as race, sex, or religious affiliation.
If, in the aftermath of Rosenfeld, the volitional test was a tenable interpretation of
Oklahoma's public policy exception, it was, in fact, far off the mark. Contrary to the
implications of all earlier cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tate v. BrowningFerris Industries applied the public policy exception to a racially motivated
discharge. In creating a common law action for employment discrimination, Tate
provides an additional remedy for a plaintiff who may also seek relief under federal
and state anti-discrimination laws. This availability of statutory relief has led many
jurisdictions to reject the application of the public policy exception to discrimination
claims.
I1. Tate v. Browning-FerrisIndustries: Toward a Common Law
of Employment Discrimination
A. Facts
Walter Tate, an African-American male, was terminated by Browning-Ferris
Industries (BFI)subsequent to the filing of two racial discrimination grievances with

91. L. at 80,035.
92. ld.
(quoting Hinson, 742 P.2d at 552-53).

93. A termination for whistleblowing or reporting the illegal acts of an employer or fellow
employees presents one of the strongest claims under the public policy exception. See PERIrrT, supra
note 3, § 5.33, at 508; Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876,879 (Il1.1981) (holding
that "there is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty than
the enforcement of a state's criminal code").
94. Tate v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992).
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). When the EEOC failed to
resolve the dispute, Tate sued in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964' and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act,' alleging a racially motivated

discharge. In addition to his pursuit of statutory remedies, Tate also sought relief
under a pendent state claim for tortious wrongful discharge.' Tate asserted that his
termination violated the public policy of the State of Oklahoma and was actionable
under the exception to at-will employment recognized in Burk.

BF moved that the trial court dismiss the public policy tort claim on the grounds
that federal and state human rights statutes provide a different and exclusive remedy

for racially motivated discharges. The federal district court, uncertain as to the
applicable law, certified the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for clarification?8
B. Holding in Tate
The Oklahoma Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing the federal

preemption of state law, although neither party in Tate contended that Title VII
proscribed state laws against discrimination. Holding that Title VII was a floor

beneath which federally provided protection may not drop rather than a ceiling above
which it may not ris ,, the court restated the well-established principle that the federal
civil rights law did not prohibit a plaintiff from seeking relief under analogous state

laws.' Indeed, the court recognized that Title VII allows for state remedies that are
both different and broader than those provided by federal law.'"

95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2C00e to 2003-17 (Supp. III 1991).
96. 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101-1901 (1991).
97. Under the doctr ne of pendent jurisdiction, state claims may be litigated along with a federal
claim in federal court if both claims arise out of the same transaction or set of facts. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(Supp. 1990); see also United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that federal
courts may exercise juriE diction over both federal and state claims where both claims "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact"). Federal jurisdiction over state claims in these instances is a matter
of discretion for the federal court. See, e.g., Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metro. Detroit, 510
F. Supp. 722, 725 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over state claim for breach of
contract in a Title VII action). Courts may be especially reluctant to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
state claims when the federal claim is based on Title VII. PERRrrr, supra note 3, §2.35, at 110. An indepth examination of the issues involved here is outside the scope of this note. For a full treatment of
the problems of litigating state claims alongside Title VII claims, see Andrea Catania, State Employment
DiscriminationRemedies and PendentJurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to FederalCourts, 32 AM.
U. L. REV. 777 (1983) (advocating a fuller integration of Title VII and state claims).
98. Pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 OKLA.STAT. § 1601 (1991),
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified the following question
to the Oklahoma Suprem, Court:
Where an at-will employee terminated by a private employer files suit alleging facts that,
if true, violate state and federal statutes providing remedies for employment discrimination, can the employee-plaintiff state a tort cause of action based on the same facts,
pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-will termination rule, recently recognized
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Burk v. K-Mart, 770 P.2d 25 (Okla. 1989).
Tate, 833 P.2d at 1220.
99. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1222-23.
100. Id. at 1223.
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The court next addressed the more salient as well as vexing question of whether the
state statute prohibiting employment discrimination precluded a tortious wrongful
discharge claim. The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act was enacted to provide a
state equivalent to the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964."' The Oklahoma law
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, or handicap"° and further provides a regulatory remedy through the
Oklahoma Human Rights Commission."m The Commission may, inter alia, order an
award of reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's fees and costs."
BE argued that a public policy tort claim was, at best, duplicative of the Oklahoma
Anti-Discrimination Act and, at worst, a distortion of carefully crafted legislative
schemes. Tate, conversely, contended that the administrative remedies provided by the
federal and state statutes were insufficient to redress his grievance and deter employers
from discriminatory behavior. In holding that Tate could pursue both statutory and
common law relief, the court analogized the Oklahoma statute with Title VII." As
Title VII was not seen by the court as an exclusive remedy, the court reasoned that
the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, based on that federal law, should likewise not
be interpreted as precluding other sources of relief."l
The Tate court specifically identified two reasons for allowing a public policy
exception claim for a racially motivated discharge. First, the court noted that a
common law claim is always viable unless the state legislation textually demonstrates
its intent to occupy the entire field of employment discrimination."° The Oklahoma
Anti-Discrimination Act does not show such an intent; it was not designed to be an
all-inclusive remedy." s The court wrote that "[w]here the common law gives a
remedy, and another is provided by statute, the latter is merely cumulative, unless the
statute declares it to be exclusive." "°Thus, the court held that a state tort claim
under the public policy exception should be seen as supplemental to statutory
relief.'
Second, the court, with only a brief discussion, held that failure to recognize a tort
action in Tate would create a dichotomous division of discriminatory remedies at state
law."' The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act explicitly provides a private right of
action only for cases of handicap discrimination."' To deny victims of race

101. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (1991).
102. Id. § 1302(A).
103. Id. § 1501.
104. Id. § 1505(C).
105. Tate, 830 P.2d at 1229.
106. Id. at 1230-31.
107. Id. at 1225.
108. Id. at 1226.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 1230-31.
111. Id.at 1229.
112. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1901(A) (1991). The section provides:
If a charge for discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap is filed under the
provision of Sections 1101 through 1801 of Title 25 of the Oklahoma Statutes and is not
resolved to the satisfaction of the charging party, within one hundred and eighty (180)
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discrimination a private cause of action, the court held, would create the unacceptable
situation where one class of discrimination victims is rewarded more generously than
another."'
IV. Evaluating Tate: A Frameworkfor Analysis
The common law provides plaintiffs with procedural advantages and potentially
greater remedies tham are available under anti-discrimination statutes."' As a result,

most courts that have considered the applicability of the public policy exception to
cases of employment discrimination have concluded that a claim under the exception

should not be allowed where relief is also available under statutes."' These courts
have usually expressed concern that a common law claim would allow a plaintiff to
circumvent carefully crafted statutory remedies."" A few courts, however, allow
plaintiffs to pursue a common law public policy action in addition to seeking statutory

remedies." 7 At first glance, these two approaches to the viability of a common law

days from the filing of such charge, the charging party may commence an action for
redress against ary person who is alleged to have discriminated against the charging party
and against any person named as respondent in the charge, such action to be commenced
in the district court of this state for the county in which the unlawful employment practice
is alleged to hav: been committed.
Id. Under the Oklahoma statute, victims of handicap discrimination may seek nominal or actual damages
and receive a jury trial. Id.
113. Tate, 830 P.2d at 1229.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 129-37.
115. Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1978); Hoopes
v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979); Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, 803 F.2d 746 (Ist Cir.
1986); Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988); Napoleon v. Xerox
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1121) (D. Conn. 1987); Lui v. Intercontinental Hotel Corp., 634 F. Supp. 684 (D.
Haw. 1986); Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Salazar v. Furrs
Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403 (D.N.M. 1986); Lofton v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 295 (D. Me. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 764 F.2d
19 (1st Cir. 1985); Krushinski v. Roadway Express, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 934 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Crews v.
Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984); Pierce v. New Process Co., 580 F. Supp. 1543 (W.D.
Pa. 1984); Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Chekey v. BTR Realty,
575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. I1I. 1982);
McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd,
619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 19&:0); Ficarda v. Lockhead, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1987); Gamble v. Levitz
Furniture, 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md.
1989); Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475 N.E.2d 1227 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Howard v. Dorr Wollen Co.,
414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980); Welch v. Brown's Nursing Home, 484 N.E.2d 178 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984);
Kofoid v. Woodard Hotels, 716 P.2d 771 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Tombollo v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.
1984); Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985); Wilson v. Vlasic Foods, Inc., 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2419 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Tarr v. Riberglass, Inc., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3688 (D. Kan.
1984); Vasquez v. National Geographic Socy, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 295 (D. Md. 1982).
116. See, e.g., Melley v. Gillette, 475 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that the
creation of a new common law action would interfere with the relief of the state anti-discrimination
statute).
117. Only Arizona, Mvlichigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington unequivocally allow
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discrimination claim seem completely irreconcilable. However, a close examination
of the cases on this issue reveals a common analytical framework and raises questions
about the cogency of the Oklahoma court's reasoning in Tate v. Browning-Ferris
Industries. This part of the note examines the significance and appropriateness of
expanding the public policy exception to embrace employment discrimination. This

part focuses particularly on the legislative intent in enacting anti-discrimination statutes
and different jurisdictions' approaches to common law discrimination claims.
A. The Legislative Intent in Federaland State Anti-DiscriminationStatutes
While federal statutes often provide comprehensive remedial schemes to combat
employment discrimination, courts have held that these statutes do not foreclose other

available remedies."' For example, Title VII, one of the most-invoked federal civil
rights measures, was specifically designed to provide only a threshold of protection
to employees." 9 The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress was
aware that other federal as well as state statutes prohibited employment discrimination."2 Yet Congress did not provide that Title VII preempted these alternative

sources of relief.'' By refusing to make Title VII the exclusive remedy for
employment discrimination, Congress condoned the granting of supplemental relief in

a common lav action for employment discrimination. See Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 F.2d
359 (9th Cir. 1988); Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Broomfield v.
Lundell, 767 P.2d 697 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 189 N.W.2d 243 (Mich.
1971); Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 272 N.W.2d 550 (Mich. 1978); Erickson v. Marsh &
McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990); Lally v. Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317 (N.J. 1981);
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, 805 P.2d 723 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d
1258 (Wash. 1990); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984).
118. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (stating that "legislative
enactments in [the] area [of civil rights] have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or
overlapping remedies"); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975)
(holding that Congress made several administrative and judicial remedies available to combat
employment discrimination).
In California Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,281 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the availability of other remedies under Title VII. The Court held that only in three situations
is a state remedy preempted by federal law. lIL First, Congress may preempt state law by so stating in
express terms. Id. Second, state laws are preempted by federal laws where the scheme of federal
regulations is "sufficiently comprehensive" to indicate that Congress left no room for supplemental state
action. Id. at 282. Third, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal laws. Id.
Regarding Title VII, the Court found irrelevant the first and second paths leading to preemption. Id
Title VII, the Court held, neither explicitly preempts state anti-discrimination laws nor evinces
congressional intent to make civil rights the exclusive domain of the federal government. Moreover,
addressing the third avenue of preemption, the Court reasoned that Title VII was enacted with the
intention of preserving state fair employment laws. Thus, the court concluded that there is a very narrow
scope of preemption under Title VII. Id. at 283. Plaintiffs can usually seek relief under both federal and
state laws.
119. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) (holding that "Title VII was
designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination").
120. Id at 49.
121. Id.
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cases of workplace discrimination."z Like Title VII, other federal civil rights statutes
have also been held not to preempt additional state and federal remedies.' "

Most state anti-discrimination statutes mirror Title VII.' Although varying
slightly between jurisdictions, these state human rights statutes usually forbid
discrimination at least on the basis of race, sex, and religion." In addition, the
statutes usually create an administrative body to hear complaints and provide redress
to the those aggrieved by discrimination." As state statutes closely resemble Title
VII, it is reasonable to impute to these statutes an intent not to create exclusive
remedial schemes.'" Absent clear indication from the state legislature that the statute
was intended to preclude all other types of relief, courts should allow other remedies
that are consistent with the statute. This view is consonant with the nearly uniform
understanding that civil rights laws are best served by the availability of multiple
enforcement mechanisms.'2
B. Significance of Allowing a Common Law Action to Supplement Statutory Relief

Although federal and state anti-discrimination statutes provide remedies for
discrimination, there are reasons for questioning the effectiveness of these sources of
relief. Federal and state civil rights laws usually provide a short statute of limitations
period in which a complaint can be filed." Thus, an understandable reluctance to
file a claim can often result in an absolute bar to relief. In addition, there are usually
limits on the amount of available damages awarded under anti-discrimination

122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not preempt state common law causes of action);
Jackson v. Cox, 540 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985, one of the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, does not preempt state law remedies); Neulist v. County of Nassau,
375 N.Y.S.2d 402,403 (App. Div. 1975) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, one of the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Acts, provides "a remedy in federal courts supplementary to any remedy any state might have").
124. Only two states, Alabama and Arkansas, have not passed a comprehensive anti-discrimination
statute. [8A Fair Employment Practices Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 451:102-03 (1993). For an
analysis of state human rights laws, see Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and
Common-Law Remediesjbr Employment Discrimination,5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1982).
125. Compare, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.010 to 22.10.020 (1992) (prohibiting discrimination
in employment on the tasis of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, physical or mental
disability, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood) with IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5901 to 67-5912
(1992) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, or national origin).
126. Wald, supra note 124, at 43 n.4 (citations omitted).
127. This interpretation has received the imprimatur of scholarly support. See Marc D. Greenbaum,
Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination,58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 92 (1985),
128. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
129. Under Title VI, for example, a complaint must be filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the discriminatory act, or within 300 days in a state with
a deferral fair employment practices agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. III 1991). The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act contains an identical limitations period. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988).
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statutes.' Furthermore, in some instances a jury trial is not allowed under a
statutory cause of action.'
State attempts to deal with discrimination are particularly fraught with problems.
For example, state remedial schemes are often hampered by budgetary constraints that
limit staff and resources.' As a result, filing a complaint under the state statute can
be pointless. There is also evidence that state agencies responsible for enforcing antidiscrimination laws are not aggressive in carrying out their duties.33

Recognition of a common law action for employment discrimination improves a
plaintiffs chances for success in a wrongful dismissal suit. The most significant

benefit to a plaintiff of a common law action is the availability of a greater range of
damages. Whereas most employment discrimination statutes limit the amount of

recoverable damages, a plaintiff suing under common law usually may seek the full
panoply of damages allowed under state law, including compensatory and punitive
damages."M Furthermore, a trial before a jury is automatically available in a state
common law action.'35 There is some evidence that a jury trial increases a plaintiffs
probability of success in a discrimination suit." Finally, a common law claim allows
plaintiffs to avail themselves of the statute of limitations of such an action. While

employment discrimination statutes typically provide a 180- to 300-day statute of
limitations, the limitations periods on tort and contract actions are usually much
longer. 3 Thus, a plaintiff could file a claim under the public policy exception even

where the time limit for seeking statutory relief has expired.
C. Common Law Actions for Employment Discrimination:A Typology
In determining whether a common law remedy may be sought in an area where
statutory relief already exists, a court must determine whether the statutory remedy
was intended to be exclusive."n This project is easiest in cases where the legislature
has clearly evinced its intentions. Where the legislature is silent as to a statute's
exclusivity, the extent to which a statute will be viewed as precluding all other

130. Title VII was amended in 1991 to allow for compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-17 (Supp. III 1991).
131. See PERRIrP,
supra note 3, § 2.38.
132. Wald, supranote 124, at 43. The limited capacity of state fair employment agencies was also
recognized by Congress in considering the preemptive scope of Title VII. 110 CONG. REC. 7205 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Clark), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 1 THE
LEGISLAnvE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF ThE CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964, at 3344 (William S.
Hein Co. photo. reprint n.d.) (stating that, in some states, enforcement of civil rights was hampered by
"inadequate legislation, inadequate procedures, or an inadequate budget').
133. Wald, supra note 124, at 43 n.47 (citations omitted).
134. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 699 (,V. Va. 1982) (awarding
compensatory damages in a public policy exception tort case); Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353 (I11.
1978) (holding that punitive damages were allowable under the public policy exception).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
136. Greenbaum, supra note 127, at 69 n.16 (citations omitted).
137. See supra note 129. In Oklahoma, the statute of limitations on most tort claims is two years.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 95 (1991). For most contract actions, the statute of limitations is five years. Id.
138. Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Common Law Cases, 50 GEo.

WASH. L. REV. 554, 556-57 (1982).
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remedies is usually left to implication.'39 The general rule, accepted in a majority of
jurisdictions, is that where a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty, the
remedy provided by the statute for enforcement of that right is exclusive."
However, where a right is established at common law, before a statutory remedy is
created, the statutory remedy will generally be considered merely cumulative. ",
There are two related but analytically distinct instances in which these standard
presumptions of statutory construction are rebutted. First, where a statute creates a
new right, the new remedy will not be deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly
inadequate to vindicate the rights involved. 4 ' Conversely, a statute's provision of
detailed and comprehensive relief for a preexisting common law right will often be
taken as indication that the legislation was intended to preempt other channels of
relief. 43 Second, although there is some authority to the contrary, most courts have
held that a person aggrieved by the violation of a civil rights statute may pursue a
remedy necessary for full restitution, even if the statute does not expressly provide for
such a remedy.'"
Using the general rules of statutory construction, it is possible to draw a typology
of public policy exception cases dealing with employment discrimination. Three
categories of cases can be identified. The first category encompasses cases in which
a claim under the public policy exception was allowed as a result of actions attendant
to the employment discrimination, such as retaliation for filing a complaint with the
EEOC or for resisting an unlawful activity. 45 Although these cases arise from a
charge of employm.nt discrimination, they closely resemble retaliatory discharge
cases, a well-recognized use of the public policy exception."
The second category covers cases in which courts have analyzed the source of the
public policy in question and scrutinized the legislative intent in enacting the particular
anti-discrimination statute. Absent indication of legislative intent to preempt the
common law, courts have allowed common law claims where the public policy is
rooted in a source other than the human rights statute itself." However, where the
anti-discrimination statute is the source of the state public policy or the comprehensive

139. 2A NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.05 (4th
ed. 1975) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND].
140. See, e.g., Weiszmann v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Colo. 1990); Rojo v. Kliger,
801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 19901; Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co., 393 S.E.2d 162 (S.C. 1989); Schactner v.
Department of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 422 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
141. SUTHERLAND, f'upra note 139, § 50.05, at 441.
142. See, e.g., Tucker v. Missoula Light & R,, 250 P. 11 (Mont. 1926); Arterberry v. Texas Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 453 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970); Wiggins v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 357 S.E.2d
745 (W. Va. 1987).
143. SUTHERLAND, supra note 139, § 50.05, at 440-41; see also Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank,
571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
144. See, e.g., Pompy v. General Motors Corp., 189 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1971); Randall v. Cowlitz
Amusements Inc., 76 P.2d 1017 (Wash. 1938).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 150-59.
146. See supra note 84.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 164-68.
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nature of the statute indicates a legislative intent to preclude other remedies, courts
have generally held that the statutory remedy is exclusive."
The third category consists of cases in which courts have focused on the grounds
for implying a private right of action from a statute that does not expressly allow for
such an action. Where the remedies in the state human rights statute have been found
insufficient to enforce the public policy of the state or provide redress to the
discharged employee, some courts have allowed plaintiffs to seek the more generous
ex delicto remedies available under the public policy exception. "4
1. Category One: Retaliationfor Resistance to Discrimination
The first category is well exemplified by contrasting two cases from Oregon. In
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 5 the plaintiff alleged that she had been given poor
evaluations, denied pay raises, and ultimately discharged when she resisted her
supervisor's sexual advances. The plaintiff sued, claiming unlawful sex discrimination
under the Oregon Fair Employment Act and a public policy wrongful discharge.
The Holien court began its analysis by noting that sexual harassment on the job was
forbidden by both state and federal law.' However, the court indicated that, while
sexual harassment was odious, such conduct alone did not form the basis of a claim
under Oregon's public policy exception." z Instead, the court held that the plaintiffs
termination for exercising her right to resist the harassment was the appropriate basis
for the common law claim." Analogizing termination for resistance to sexual
harassment to termination for filing a worker's compensation claim, the court in Holien
emphasized the retaliatory conduct directed against the plaintiff." Thus, the court
resisted the opportunity to create a general common law action for employment
discrimination, choosing instead to find that Holien presented a standard type of public
policy exception case: an employee dismissed for exercising a legal right. 55
In Kofoid v. Woodard Hotels, Inc.," the Oregon Court of Appeals was presented
with a case that was superficially similar to Holien. The plaintiff in Kofoid was a
waitress in the dining room of a restaurant owned by the defendant. The plaintiff,
alleging that she had been fired as a result of a scheme to eliminate women from the
dining room serving staff, brought a wrongful discharge suit. The court in Kofoid
acknowledged that the defendant's alleged motive of eliminating women from the
dining room staff offended an important public policy of Oregon." Nevertheless,

148.
149.
150.
Ct. App.

See infra text accompanying notes 169-72.
See infra text accompanying notes 174-89.
689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984); see also Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, 805 P.2d 723 (Or.
1991) (holding that a public policy tort covers discharge in retaliation for resisting sexual

harassment).
151. Holien, 689 P.2d at 1297.
152. Id. at 1300. The Oregon criteria for the public policy exception are enumerated at supranote

84.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
716 P.2d 771 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 774.
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the court held that 6e facts in the case failed to justify a claim under the public policy
exception to at-will employment because the plaintiff was not discharged for pursuing
a legal right, but simply because she was a female."8 Distinguishing Holien as a
cased based on retaliation, the court stated that discrimination alone was not actionable
at common law.'The approach used by the courts in Holien and Kofoid represents an attempt to
reconcile the public policy exception's traditional emphasis on volitional activity with
the laudable desire to discourage discrimination in the workplace. The cases do not
attempt to expand the public policy exception to cover employment discrimination,
but, rather, by looking for evidence of retaliation, try to fit employment discrimination
within the accepted parameters of the exception. However, the match does not
necessarily work well, as represented by the different results in Holien and Kofoid.
While the cases are distinguishable on a factual basis, they are not so readily
differentiated on a theoretical one. If the concern of the Holien court is to eliminate
workplace sexual discrimination, it seems inconsistent to jettison that commitment
simply because, as in Kofoid, there is no evidence of a retaliatory discharge. Yet, the
result in the latter case was required by a strict adherence to the guidelines of the
public policy excepdon. Holien and Kofoid, therefore, point up both the possibilities
and limitations of using a narrow view of the public policy exception in employment
discrimination cases.
2. Category Two: Examining the Sources of the Common Law Action
In determining the exclusivity of a statutory remedy for discrimination, cases falling
within this class have focused on two considerations: First, is there a common law
right not to be discriminated against that antedates passage of the state anti-discrimination statute? Second, does the statutory remedy appear to have been intended by the
legislature to be exclusive?"w Where there is evidence that the legislature intended
the anti-discrimination statute to supersede the common law, the remedy provided by
that statute will always be held to be exclusive. 6' Likewise, if the statute creates the
right as well as provides a remedy, courts will usually hold that it forecloses all other
avenues of redress.' In cases where the right existed prior to the statute, however,
the statutory remedy will be deemed exclusive only where it appears that the
legislature intended that it be so."
In Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
asked to determine whether Arizona would apply the public policy exception to a case
of employment discrimination. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit placed great
effort in determining the sources of the state's public policy against employment

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
843 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988).
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discrimination." Finding that the public policy of Arizona against discrimination
was anterior to the passage of the state's human rights statute and further recognizing
that the state statute was not intended to be exclusive, the court held that a public
policy exception claim could be maintained." This line of reasoning was subsequently affn-med by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Broomfield v. Lundell."
Similarly, a New Jersey court held that the state's public policy against sex
discrimination was grounded in the state constitution; thus, the later passage of a state
anti-discrimination statute provided only a remedy cumulative to a preexisting
common law cause of action based on the state constitution.us
The search for a source of public policy beyond the anti-discrimination statute itself
offers a potentially promising source of integrating employment discrimination into the
public policy exception. In most instances, however, this search has led courts to
dismiss common law claims based on workplace discrimination. In Mahoney v.
Crocker National Bank,"6 for example, the plaintiff, claiming age discrimination,
brought suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act as well as the
public policy exception. The court acknowledged that a claim under the public policy
exception would be allowed if the common law right existed prior to the enactment
of the anti-discrimination statuteY0 However, the court in Mahoney concluded that
a common law right did not exist before the statute and, given the comprehensive
nature of the statute, no private right would be implied.' This method of analyzing
the compatibility of common law and statutory remedies for discrimination has been
followed in a number of other jurisdictions as well. In these cases, the courts have
held that, where a right is created by a statute, the plaintiff will be limited to the
remedies provided by the statute."
Where the state's expression of public policy can be found to predate the remedies
provided by an anti-discrimination statute, there are logical grounds for allowing a
common law remedy in addition to statutory relief. However, in most states,
discrimination was not actionable at common law prior to the enactment of an
employment discrimination statute. As a result, the reasoning employed in this

165. Id. at 364-65 (noting the rules of statutory construction).
166. Id. at 365.
167. 767 P.2d 697 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
168. Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 545 A.2d 812 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (holding
that the New Jersey anti-discrimination statute "supplemented existing law in the area of civil rights, it
did not supplant it"); see also tally v. Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317 (NJ. 1981).
169. 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
170. Id. at 293.
171. Id. at 293-94. The court contrasted its finding with that of the court in Hentzel v. Singer, 188
Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). Henizel concerned whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act
preempted California's wrongful discharge action. The Henizel court concluded that there was no
preemption of the common law action because the public policy against health and safety hazards in the
workplace predated the Act's prohibitions. Id. at 162-63.
172. See, e.g., Trembath v. St. Regis Paper Co., 753 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Chekey v. BTR
Realty, 575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984);
Pierce v. New Process Co., 580 F. Supp. 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Wehr v. Burroughs, 438 F. Supp. 1052
(E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
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category of cases offers little basis for the widespread creation of a common law of
workplace discrimination.
3. Category Three: Implying a PrivateRight of Action
from State Anti-DiscriminationStatutes
In cases where a statute creates a right without explicitly providing for a private
civil remedy, it is possible that such a remedy will be implied at common law."n In
these instances, courts have concentrated on the legislative intent in enacting the
statute. 74 Where thare is evidence that the legislature intended to make the statutory
relief exclusive, courts have refused to acknowledge private causes of action."'
However, courts have occasionally been willing to grant a private right of action if the
statute is interpreted as leaving room for supplemental remedies. 76
Consistent with the general judicial reluctance to recognize a common law of
employment discrimination, most courts that have considered implied causes of action
have rejected their availability where an anti-discrimination statute also provides
remedies."r These courts have usually followed a similar approach: finding that the
remedial scheme in the statute was comprehensive, the court held that this was
indication that the legislation was intended to be the sole source of relief. In Wehr v.
Burroughs,"' for example, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that the Pennsylvania state human rights statute did not imply a private civil
remedy. The court stated that "sound policy dictates that the statutory remedial scheme
be adhered to since we can presume that the legislature would have provided
additional relief in the statute if it thought it necessary."'" Similarly, in Melley v.
Gillette Corp.,'1 a Massachusetts court rejected an implied common law action. The
court, noting the advantages a plaintiff gains in a common law action, reasoned that
such an action would conflict with the comprehensive remedial scheme outlined in the
statute.'8'
Given the general tendency of civil rights statutes to allow for supplemental
remedies, courts should be reticent to conclude that a specific statute precludes all
other sources of relief." Only in cases where there is clear indication that the statute

173.

RESTATEMEN" (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 874A (1979).

174. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
175. See, e.g., Scluachta v. Curtis, 752 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusing to recognize a private
right where statute provides adequate relief to plaintiff).
176. See, e.g., Brezinski v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 626 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1986) (same); Bennett
v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990) (recognizing implied right from state statute prohibiting age
discrimination).
177. See, e.g., Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988); Crews
v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984); Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp.
295 (D. Me. 1985).
178. 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affid, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980).
179. Il
180. 475 N.E.2d 1227, 1228 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
181. Id. (stating that the "creation of a new common law action based on the public policy expressed
in [the] statute would interfere with the remedial scheme").
182. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
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was intended to be the exclusive mechanism of relief should courts foreclose other
remedies. One of the most thoughtful and instructive considerations of these issues
was provided by the Washington Supreme Court in Bennett v. Hardy. ' In Bennett,
the plaintiffs claimed that they had been fired due to their age. However, the state
human rights statute, which prohibited age discrimination, applied only to employers
with eight or more employees. The defendant in Bennett had less than eight
employees and, therefore, fell outside the coverage of Washington's anti-discrimination
statute. Consequently, the trial court concluded that no statutory cause of action
existed against the defendant.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial courts dismissal of the age
discrimination claim.Y Noting that the Washington Law Against Discrimination was
silent regarding remedies against an employer engaged in discriminatory practices, the
court held that aggrieved employees had an implied civil action under the statute."
This right, the court continued, existed even for employees, such as the plaintiffs in
Bennett, who fell outside the statute's coverage."
The Bennett court reasoned that it was the duty of courts to fashion remedies where
a statute has created a right of recovery but failed to specify relief." Holding that
an implied cause of action furthered the purposes of the state anti-discrimination
statute and was indeed necessary to assure the effectiveness of the legislation, the
court further concluded that the statute was not intended to be exclusive.n As a
result, the court held that an implied common law action was a justified measure to
further combat employment discrimination."n
The Bennett approach provides the most well-reasoned ground for integrating
employment discrimination into the common law. While Bennett placed significance
on the lack of remedies provided in the Washington statute, its analysis seems equally
applicable to cases where a statute does provide limited administrative remedies.
Where the recognition of an implied cause of action would further the policies
underlying such a statute or supplement inadequate remedies, a strong case can be
made that such an implied action should be allowed even where limited administrative
relief is available.
V. Tate: The Right Decision for the Wrong Reasons?
Part IV of this note outlined the justifications for allowing a common law action to
supplement statutory relief for employment discrimination. There are both sound
policy reasons and logical analytical grounds for recognizing such a private right of
action. Thus, the decision in Tate can be defended. However, as this part of the note
discusses, the Tate court failed to articulate any coherent basis for its holding,

183.
184.
185.
186.

784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990).
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1264.

187. Id. at 1261 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 1261-62.
189. Id. at 1262.
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mistakenly relying instead on a maxim of statutory construction that had little
relevance to the specific facts presented in the case. This part critically analyzes the
holding in Tate and presents two alternative grounds that provide greater justification
for the result in that case.
A. Tate: A Critique

Against the backdrop of the analytical framework derived from other cases on the
common law of employment discrimination, much of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
reasoning in Tate seems faulty. The confusion largely stems from the court's attempt
to place Tate in th-, second category of cases: cases which have stressed the sources
of the public policy against discrimination." The Tate court primarily emphasized
that the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act was not intended to supplant the existing
common law rights of an aggrieved employee."9 ' While this characterization of the
Oklahoma statute is well founded, the court ignored a fundamental point: the question
of statutory preemption would only be salient if there was a common law right in
Oklahoma not to be discriminated against that predated the passage of the antidiscrimination statute."n In fact, there was no such common law right in Oklahoma
and, as a result, much of the court's analysis in Tate is misdirected.
The rules of statutory construction that are adumbrated in Tate are generally similar
to those of other jurisdictions. For example, the court acknowledged that where a
statute creates a new right, breaches of that right are usually compensable only by the
remedies provided in the statute.' On the other hand, where a statute creates a new
remedy for a preexisting common law right, the statutory remedy will only be
cumulative." There is only one unique aspect to statutory construction in Oklahoma
that is relied upon by the Tate court. In some jurisdictions, legislative intent to
supersede the common law is implied from the existence of a comprehensive and
detailed statute. 195 By statutory mandate in Oklahoma, however, the common law
remains in full force unless a statute explicitly provides to the contrary; legislative
intent to preempt the common law is never inferred."
The lack of explicit prohibition of other remedies in the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act is significant, but not in the way understood by the Tate court. The court
acknowledged that the source of the public policy against race discrimination in Tate
was the Oklahoma statute itself; there was no mention of any other foundation for
the public policy exception. However, the Tate court was blithe to the implication of
this fact: in Oklahoma, there simply was no common law action for employment

190. See supra text accompanying notes 160-72.
191. Tate v. Broning-Ferris Indus., 833 P.2d 1218, 1227-29 (Okla. 1992).
192. See supra text accompanying note 163.
193. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1226 n.36.
194. Id.
195. SUTHERLANE, supra note 139, § 50.05, at 440-41.
196. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (1991). The statute provides in relevant part that "the common law, as
modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the conditions and wants of the
people, shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma." Id.
197. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1225.
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discrimination that predated passage of the state anti-discrimination law. Thus,
contrary to the courts understanding, Tate is really not a case about preemption, in
which a statutory remedy for discrimination was superimposed on a preexisting
common law right, but an example of a case where a statute created a new right, the
right to not be discriminated against, as well as provided a remedy for a violation of
that right. As there was not a preexisting right against discrimination, it was
nonsensical for the court to characterize the state anti-discrimination statute as
"cumulative." The reasoning of the second category of cases should actually have led
the court to reject Tate's claim under the public policy exception; where a statute
creates a right and a remedy, that remedy will usually be held to be an exclusive
93
one.
Given, however, that the anti-discrimination statutes are generally not intended to
be exclusive, the Tate court should have examined other possible justifications for
granting a common law action. Both the first and third categories of discriminationbased public policy exception cases suggest reasons for holding that the plaintiff in
Tate should be afforded a common law remedy. Like cases in the first category, the
court could have emphasized the retaliation directed against the plaintiff in Tate for
filing a complaint with the EEOC. By finding evidence of retaliation, the court could
have found that Tate presented a standard type of public policy exception case.
Alternatively, following the third category, the Oklahoma court could have concentrated its analysis on delineating the circumstances in which a new private right of action
is implied from a statute. Either of these approaches provides more persuasive
justification for the result in Tate than is actually offered by the decision.
B. Redeciding Tate: Alternative Groundsfor Allowing a Supplemental Common
Law Action
1. Tate as a RetaliatoryDischarge Case
In Tate, the plaintiff alleged that his termination was in retaliation for filing a
discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The court, however, placed little emphasis
on the retaliatory motives of the employer, seemingly holding that discrimination alone
was sufficient for a claim under Oklahoma's public policy exception.'" However,
retaliation against an employee who exercises a legal right to file a complaint with a
government agency can clearly be fit into the public policy exception. The Tate court
did not need to decide the more novel question of whether discrimination fell under
the exception to at-will employment.
By emphasizing the retaliatory actions of the employer, the Tate court would be
following the example of the Oregon court in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., in

198. See supratext accompanying notes 160-72.
199. The court in Tate states that "the employee who brings a common-law tort action . . .
occasioned by either a racially motivated discharge or by one in retaliation for bringing a racial
discrimination complaint" would state a claim under Oklahoma public policy exception. Id. at 1230-31
(emphasis added). This language indicates that discrimination alone will justify a common law claim.
200. 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984).
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which the public policy exception was applied to a discharge based on resistance to
sexual harassment In Holien, the court held that the plaintiff had a legal right to resist
unlawful harassment; thus, the criteria for a public policy exception claim were clearly
met."' Likewise, the Tate court could have emphasized the legal right to file
complaints with the EEOC and the retaliation due to the filing of the claim. This
would have provided a narrow but persuasive rationale for the decision in Tate to
allow a supplemental common law action.
2. Tate as Implying a Private Cause of Action from the Oklahoma AntiDiscriminationStatute
The United States Supreme Court has outlined the proper criteria for determining
whether a private right of action should be implied from a federal statute.n This test
has been applied to state statutes as well.a The Court's guidelines for the proper use
of implied rights of action indicate that such an action should be allowed in cases of
employment discrimination.
In Cort v. Ash," the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for determining
whether a private right of action should be implied from a statute that facially provides
for no such claim. The thrust of the Court's reasoning was that a private action should
be implied only when the action would help achieve the overall legislative purpose of
the statute.' Specifically, the Cort test requires that courts determine:
(a) whether the plaintiff is in the class the statute sought to benefit;
(b) if there is legislative intent to create or deny a private judicial remedy;
(c) whether a private judicial remedy would be consistent with the legislative
scheme; and
(d) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law. 20
This test, echoed by the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,"J is designed
to aid a court in ascertaining the legislative intent of a statute.

201. Id. at 13D3. Tee supra text accompanying notes 150-55.

202. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
203. For an exarnnation of state courts' treatment of the Cort test, see John H. Bauman, Note,
Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1978).
204. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
205. Id.

206. Id. For applications of the Cort test to anti-discrimination statutes, see Greenbaum, supranote
127, at 105-08 (writing that Cort supports recognizing a common law action in employment
discrimination cases); Murg & Scharman, supra note 4, at 352-54 (arguing the Cort test militates against
recognizing a common law remedy for employment discrimination).
207. Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the appropriate contexts in which

a private cause of action may be implied from a statute:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain
conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it
determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation
and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of
the class, a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action
analogous to an existing tort action.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).
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Clearly cases of employment discrimination meet the first prong of the Con test;
a victim of discrimination is a member of the class that anti-discrimination statutes
were designed to protect. The fourth prong is also easily met as erosion of the at-will
rule has historically developed through the common law.x Less obvious but equally
true is that a common law employment discrimination claim meets the second and
third prongs of Con.
Discerning legislative intent can be particularly difficult in the cases of state
statutes. There is often little explicit indication of the legislature's intent regarding
private remedies. In the case of state anti-discrimination statutes, however, the
analogy to federal civil rights statutes offers a useful guide. Like their federal
counterparts, state civil rights laws are best viewed as a floor to relief, and not as a
ceiling.20 Given the legislative willingness to allow multiple mechanisms of recovery
for civil rights violations, common law actions for employment discrimination seem
consonant with the statutory intent and would undoubtedly further the goal of deterring
workplace discrimination that underlies these statutes 2 t' The third and fourth prongs
of the Con test are fulfilled.
In recognizing an implied right of action from the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination
Statute, a court would be giving judicial acknowledgment to the overarching purpose
of all civil rights statutes: eliminating discrimination. The implied right of action is
the most persuasive analytical approach to forging a common law action for
discriminatory discharge. Creating a remedy broader in scope than that available by
focusing on retaliatory discharge, the implied cause of action provides a coherent
approach for integrating employment discrimination into the common law public
policy exception to at-will employment.
VI. Conclusion
Increasingly, the merits of the employment-at-will rule are being questioned. An
employer's arbitrary and unfettered right to discharge employees no longer seems to
comport with society's standards of fairness. The at-will rule is particularly
unacceptable when it is used as legal support for an employer's bigotry. It should not
be surprising then that courts have moved to limit the ability of employers to

208. For a discussion of the development of employment-at-will in the United States, see supratext

accompanying notes 9-48.
209. See generally Bauman, supra note 203, at 1252.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 118-37.
211. One further indication that the Oklahoma legislature did not intend for the Anti-Discrimination
Act to preclude common law remedies is found in the Act's provision for a private right of action solely

for handicap discrimination. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 1901 (1991). As the Tate court noted, it is anomalous
that victims of handicap discrimination are afforded greater relief than victims of equally pernicious race
discrimination. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1218. Indeed, such divergent remedies for members of a single

remediable class - victims of discrimination - is contrary to the Oklahoma Constitution. OKLA.
CON ST. art. V,§ 46. Implying a private cause of action for race discrimination from the Oklahoma AntiDiscrimination Act is not only grounded in the framework of Cort, but also the only way to make the

statute coherent and free of constitutional infirmity.
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discriminate on the basis of status characteristics, such as race, sex, and religious
affiliation.
There are both sound policy and analytical grounds for extending the public policy
exception to at-will employment to cover employment discrimination. Antidiscrimination statutes have almost universally been interpreted as allowing for
supplemental avenues of relief. Moreover, a common law action, by virtue of its
procedural advantages for a plaintiff, is a powerful tool in reducing workplace
discrimination, the avowed goal of most civil rights statutes. The Tate decision is,
then, ultimately a correct result. Yet, by its uncertain analysis, the Tate court failed
to offer reasoning equal in quality to the equity of its decision.
Brad Rogers Carson
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